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Abstract. The offshoring of more advanced activities is increasing and a debate about 
the limits of offshoring has emerged. Companies are fine-slicing their value chains, and 
moving beyond the offshoring of peripheral and non-core activities to the offshoring 
of advanced and essential activities that are closer to their core (e.g. research, design 
and product development). The challenge is to understand the limits of offshoring and 
the most appropriate modes of offshoring. The purpose of this paper is to analyze what 
activities are offshorable and how best to govern offshored activities. We argue that com-
panies are redefining their core activities and in this process, some essential activities 
previously viewed as core activities are being detached from the core, and they become 
more offshorable. 
The study uses a sample of 565 offshoring operations conducted by 263 multinational 
companies from 15 European countries. A logistic regression was used to analyze the 
relationship between the activities offshored (non-core versus essential activities) and the 
offshoring mode implemented (captive offshoring versus offshore outsourcing). We find 
that essential activities are typically offshored using the captive mode, while offshore 
outsourcing is commonly used to offshore non-core activities; and this trend is even more 
pronounced in knowledge-intensive companies where interfaces between the various ac-
tivities are less standardized.
This paper offers managers and CEOs an integrative tool that can make easier decisions 
regarding offshoring modes (captive versus offshore outsourcing) and serves as a refer-
ence point for further analyses of the implementation of offshoring strategies in multina-
tional enterprises.
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Introduction
Lured by cost savings, access to talented people and new knowledge, an increasing 
number of companies in a wide variety of industries, including manufacturing, informa-
tion technology and services (Boardman et al. 2008) have begun to offshore a variety 
of activities. As competition intensifies and the pace of change accelerates, companies 
are considering possibilities to globally source products, knowledge and services. In-
creasingly, companies are finding that they cannot just rely on the existing configuration 
of their activities, which is typically focused on the home country. Rather, they must 
consider opportunities for global sourcing and offshoring. In this sense, offshoring has 
become an imperative for many companies (Lewin, Peeters 2006; Pyndt, Pedersen 2006; 
Dossani, Kenney 2003).
In order to be able to reconfigure activities and reap the benefits of offshoring, com-
panies are organizing their value chain activities more efficiently. In particular, they 
are fine slicing the value chain in smaller but more coherent modules that can be sepa-
rated from each other into space and time. The value chain can be reconfigured along 
a number of dimensions, especially in terms of the location and governance of each 
value chain activity (Asmussen et al. 2009; Asmussen et al. 2007). Companies must 
make decisions about which activities to offshore and how to govern those activities 
(i.e. whether to keep the activities within company boundaries or to contract them out 
to independent suppliers).
In relation to these decisions about how and which activities to offshore, it is often 
argued that companies should keep core activities in-house, and outsource non-core 
activities. However, several key questions remain unanswered: What are “core” activi-
ties and how can they be differentiated from “non-core” activities? Is this division truly 
dichotomous, i.e. companies only carry out core and non-core activities, or is there a 
continuum along which some activities are closer to or further away from core activi-
ties? As companies fine slice their value chains, they may offshore not only peripheral 
and non-core activities but also activities that are closer to the core (e.g. research, design 
and product development). In fact, high value-added activities (engineering, R&D or 
product design) as well as standardized IT and business processes are increasingly be-
ing offshored (Kedia, Mukherjee 2009; UNCTAD 2005). As Lampel and Bhalla argue, 
the “offshoring of high value added activities will be incorporated into the strategic 
repertoire of organizations in the 21st century” (2011:357).
In this paper, we argue that companies are redefining their core activities. In this pro-
cess, some essential activities previously viewed as core activities are being detached 
from the core and made more offshorable. We also propose that while companies typi-
cally keep their distinctive core activities in house and close to headquarters, they are 
beginning to offshore essential activities that are close to core activities, i.e. activities 
that are critical to the company’s competitive advantage. Companies can leverage on 
suppliers that have more specialized competences, and they can tap into knowledge and 
talent in other parts of the world through the offshoring of these essential activities. 
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We propose that essential activities will be offshored to own subsidiaries (captive off-
shoring), while the offshoring of non-core activities will often involve independent 
suppliers (offshore outsourcing). Furthermore, we argue that this differentiation between 
modes of offshoring will be even more pronounced in knowledge-intensive industries, 
where interfaces between the different activities are less standardized. The proposed 
hypotheses are tested on an unique dataset covering 263 companies from 15 different 
European countries. In total, the dataset covers 565 offshoring operations spanning five 
different value chain activities. It includes information on offshoring modes and the 
importance of these activities for the competitive advantage of the companies in ques-
tion. This data set allows us to study offshoring decisions at the more disaggregated 
activity level rather than at the more aggregated firm or industry levels typically in 
focus in extant research. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 1, the principal find-
ings of the existing literature are reviewed, gaps are identified, and the hypotheses are 
developed. Outlines of the methodology and the operational measures used in the study 
are presented in section 2. The statistical analysis and results are presented in section 3 
before conclusions and implications are discussed. 
1. Literature review and development of hypotheses
1.1. Captive offshoring or offshore outsourcing
Previous research defines offshoring as the transfer of business processes and activi-
ties to foreign locations (Levy 2005). A distinction is typically made between captive 
offshoring (the intra-company transfer of activities to fully owned subsidiaries) and off-
shore outsourcing (the inter-company transfer of activities to independent companies or 
companies with minority stakes). We view the term captive offshoring as synonymous 
with other concepts used in the literature – including internal offshoring (OECD 2005), 
offshore in-house sourcing (OECD 2007) and offshore insourcing (Kotabe et al. 2007) – 
that refer to a company’s international relocation of activities to its own subsidiaries. We 
use the term offshore outsourcing to refer to the relocation of international activities to 
independent firms, which others have denoted as non-captive offshoring (WTO 2005) 
and external offshoring (OECD 2005). Captive offshoring clearly overlaps with foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in the sense that captive offshoring involves FDI. However, not 
all FDI involves captive offshoring (Levy, Dunning 1993). Captive offshoring involves 
FDI for those activities that have a global (or regional) mandate and are relocated to 
other locations, while FDI includes many local and market-oriented activities (such as 
sales subsidiaries and production for the local market) that are not viewed as offshoring.
The offshoring trend originated in the 1960s, when primarily blue-collar manufactur-
ing activities were relocated to low-cost countries. As the communication infrastruc-
ture improved and telecommunication costs decreased, offshoring was taken to another 
level (Levy 2005). The past decade has witnessed an increasing propensity to offshore. 
Recent findings presented by the Offshoring Research Network (ORN), which has col-
lected the most complete data on companies offshoring activities (a data set that en-
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compasses more than 1,600 companies globally), indicated that offshoring has boomed 
in the last five years (Lewin, Cuoto 2006). Yet, even as offshoring has boomed, it has 
become more manageable. The political and regulatory environments of host countries 
have eased considerably, while the knowledge, flexibility and skills of local labor have 
increased in many emerging countries without a corresponding increase in costs for 
that resource. 
In many ways, the logic of offshoring is breaking away from the dominant view in inter-
national business studies. The dominant view suggests that internationalization mainly 
follows a market-oriented logic (a downstream logic), where competitive advantage 
is created, in the first instance, at home. This advantage can then be exploited abroad 
through a global network of subsidiaries that mainly apply and adapt the home-based 
advantage to the local markets. However, offshoring today follows an upstream logic 
focused on how companies can tap into resources abroad, including cheap labor, human 
talent and new knowledge (Boardman et al. 2008; Sridhar, Balachandran 1997). Ac-
cording to this logic, competitive advantage is created and developed by sourcing the 
necessary elements and knowledge from many parts of the world. 
In his examination of R&D subsidiaries, Kuemmerle (1997) distinguished between the 
home-based exploiting logic and the home-based augmenting logic for subsidiaries. 
Offshoring is a phenomenon related to the home-based augmenting logic, as its start-
ing point lies in the assumption that companies need to source some of their valuable 
inputs and activities on a global scale and not just in the home market (Martínez-Noya 
et al. 2012). Porter (1986) highlighted the shift in offshoring logic when he proposed 
that companies are moving from a dispersed value chain configuration (the mini-replica 
case with optimization in each individual market) to a concentrated value chain con-
figuration (with focus on global optimization). A concentrated value chain configuration 
implies that companies optimize the organization and location of each individual value 
chain activity on a global scale. Each value chain activity is concentrated in a different 
location in order to take advantage of location-specific factors. For example, a company 
may decide to locate production in China, IT in India and R&D in the US.
The increase in offshoring comes hand in hand with efforts to split the value chain into 
ever finer modules (sets of activities) that are internally coherent, and to standardized 
interfaces with other modules to limit the need for extensive communication and coordi-
nation. Many companies have gone through this process of fine slicing the value chain, 
which basically entails learning about their own processes in detail, standardizing some 
activities, bundling activities in new ways and specifying interfaces among activities. 
Basically, this process is about cutting the constituent elements of the value chain into 
ever finer slivers. Often, this process is carried out under the heading of “lean” or “Six 
Sigma”, the goal of which is to reorganize, standardize and specify interfaces among 
different activities. A major advantage of the modularized, fine-sliced structure is that it 
allows for more specialization, and for the gathering and dissemination of information 
to those decision takers that are best placed to use it. 
According to some authors (Buckley, Ghauri 2004; Contractor et al. 2010; Ørberg, 
Pedersen 2010), the fine slicing of the value chain is necessary if offshoring strategies 
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are to be pursued (see Fig. 1). In light of the trend among firms to “slice” value chains 
into finer parts and locate these individual parts worldwide, these authors propose that 
offshoring be analyzed at the activity level.
1.2. The offshoring of core and non-core activities
The offshoring of activities is no longer perceived as an operational tool focused on 
cost savings, but as a strategic tool. Activities with strategic importance that are closer 
to the heart of the firm are increasingly being offshored (Contractor et al. 2010), so that 
offshoring includes not only manufacturing jobs, but also more advanced and higher 
value-adding activities (Lewin, Peeters 2006; UNCTAD 2004). Ward (2004) acknowl-
edged a shift in the offshoring trend from the offshoring of standardized processes to 
the offshoring of increasingly knowledge-intensive processes that require high levels 
of domain and subject expertise together with higher-end professional talent. In fact, 
Lewin and Cuoto (2006) reported that although more standardized activities, like IT and 
call centers, are still the most common offshored activities, offshoring is increasing the 
most among more advanced activities, such as R&D, engineering and product design. 
Similarly, Lewin et al. (2009) suggested the emerging global race for talent as the main 
driver behind the offshoring of more advanced activities. 
More recent literature divides the spectrum of relocated or subcontracted activities on 
the basis of the non-core and core distinction (Levy 2005; Heikkilä, Cordon 2002; 
Gilley, Rasheed 2000). However, this distinction raises the issue of whether the scale 
is really dichotomous in terms of core versus non-core. Another question also arises: 
When companies offshore advanced activities (e.g. product development and R&D), 
are they necessarily offshoring core activities? Activities “closer to the core” that have 
typically been conducted near or at headquarters are now being offshored. For exam-
ple, in the automobile industry (one of the first industries to engage in offshoring), 
entire sub-systems of cars, such as power-trains, have been offshored to subsidiaries 
that have global mandates to develop those sub-systems. However, even in this indus-
try, the architectural core activities are typically still conducted close to the heart of the 
company, where headquarters can exercise full control (Harland et al. 2005). A similar 
trend is seen in the pharmaceutical industry, where many of the innovative processes are 
outsourced to specialized “contract research organizations” (CROs) that offer services 
such as product development; clinical trial management; and preclinical, toxicology and 
clinical laboratory services for the processing of trial samples. Basically, some phar-
maceutical firms have narrowed their core activities to the high valued-added activities 
that occur early on in the innovation process (the architecture of new discoveries) and 
Fig. 1. Fine slicing of the value chain  
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to customer interactions at the other end of the value chain, while they outsource the 
operational parts of their research processes to CROs. Pharmaceutical companies out-
sourced approximately USD 15 billion to CROs in 2007 (Contractor et al. 2010). As 
these examples show, companies tend to redefine their core activities in order to focus 
on a narrower set of high value-added activities that typically includes the capability to 
form the architecture of the system and the interfaces among the elements in the system, 
while the more operational part of the system are outsourced or offshored.
Consequently, we argue for the introduction of more fine-grained distinctions of the 
firm’s activities. We suggest that activities be divided into three groups: core activi-
ties, which are the true core activities that are distinctive and crucial for the company’s 
competitive advantage and often of an architectural nature; essential activities, which 
are advanced activities that are complementary and important for the competitive advan-
tage; and non-core activities, which are the peripheral activities. Heikkilä and Cordon 
(2002) make a similar distinction between distinctive competencies (those allowing the 
company to excel) and essential competencies (those needed to sustain profitable opera-
tions). Quinn (1999) defines three similar types of activities: a) core activities, i.e. those 
that the company performs better than any other enterprise (best-in-world capabilities); 
b) essential activities, i.e. those that are demanded by customers or are needed to defend 
the core activities; and c) non-core activities, i.e. those that should be outsourced. 
According to McIvor (2000: 31), “the depth of evaluation of the organization’s value 
chain can take place at the activity (such as logistics) or sub-activity (material han-
dling) level depending on the particular circumstances of the organization”. To ensure 
efficiency and effectiveness in offshoring practices, a detailed analysis of each value 
chain activity is necessary. In this process, each activity should be disaggregated into 
sub-activities and each sub-activity should then be evaluated according to its strategic 
importance. In this sense, a new value chain configuration is developed (see Fig. 2). 
Offshoring decision models consider typically, among other criteria, the context of the 
activity (Fill, Visser 2000) and the strategic importance of the activity as key factors in 
offshoring decisions (Kremic et al. 2006).
Fig. 2. A new value chain configuration in the fine-slicing context  
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We stress that essential activities are often activities that were previously core activities, 
that still remain close to the core and that remain important for the competitive advan-
tage of the company. Our distinction between core activities and essential activities is 
in line with the fine slicing of value chain activities, where some activities previously 
perceived as protected core activities are separated out. In that sense, core activities are 
typically narrowing, while essential activities are separated out as more independent 
activities with defined interfaces with other activities (as shown in Fig. 3). Gottfred-
son et al. hinted at this development when they highlighted that only the “core of the 
core” should be kept inside, while “outsourcing is becoming so sophisticated that even 
core functions like engineering, R&D, manufacturing, and marketing can – and often 
should – be moved outside” (2005: 132).
Initially, the majority of organizations followed the established convention based on 
the competency view of the firm – they mainly offshored non-core activities. Non-core 
activities, also referred to as peripheral activities, are those that are not vital for a com-
pany’s competitive position (Quinn, Hilmer 1994) and are less strategically relevant 
for a company’s long-term success (Gilley, Rasheed 2000). One strong argument for 
the offshoring of non-core activities is that it enables companies to allocate more re-
sources – human resources, capital, time and effort – to creating and maintaining their 
core activities (Gilley, Rasheed 2000; Quinn, Hilmer 1994). In addition to this argument, 
which builds on the advantages of specialization, the benefits of offshoring may include 
increased flexibility and cost savings. 
However, these arguments for the offshoring of non-core activities point towards the 
implementation of offshore outsourcing rather than captive offshoring, as only the out-
sourcing of a task to an independent company will allow the focal company to reap 
the benefits of specialization and to focus all of their resources on the development and 
maintenance of core activities. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H1: The likelihood of offshoring non-core activities will be greater when offshore out-
sourcing is adopted.
Recently, a number of studies have reported a trend towards the international relocation 
of either activities that are strategically important for the company’s core (Baden-Fuller 
et al. 2000; Gilley, Rasheed 2000; Lei, Hitt 1995). These important activities include 
research, design, engineering and product development. The main arguments for relo-
Fig. 3. Core and non-core activities  
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cating these activities are to benefit from specialized suppliers competent in specific 
activities, and the need to tap into critical knowledge and talented people wherever 
they can be found. Companies cannot rely on getting the necessary knowledge inputs 
from their home bases, so they need to scan and mobilize knowledge on a global scale 
(Doz et al. 2001). 
The offshoring of these activities requires ongoing communication and co-ordination 
within the company. As such, there might be inherent benefits in retaining these activi-
ties within the boundary of the company rather than passing management control and 
decision rights to a third party. Captive offshoring also has other benefits, as it is easier 
to protect knowledge and exploit it internally in such contexts. Therefore, we propose:
H2: The likelihood of offshoring essential activities will be greater when captive off-
shoring is adopted.
If these hypotheses are supported, our understanding of the decision process surround-
ing which activities to offshore and which to outsource should be extended. Tradition-
ally, decisions on which activities to outsource have been assumed to involve analyses 
of which activities were core and which were non-core, with the intention of outsourc-
ing only non-core activities to external suppliers. Today, the decision is clearly more 
complex, as some of the advanced activities (the essential activities) are separated out 
from the core activities and have become offshorable, as illustrated in Figure 4. 
1.3. Knowledge-intensive firms and offshoring
In offshoring strategies, as in any relationship involving location, control and value 
creation, some resources play a key role. “Knowledge” is one such resource (Mud-
ambi, Venzin 2010; Shin et al. 2009; Mudambi 2008; Pyndt, Pedersen 2006). Kremic 
et al. (2006) suggest that “knowledge” is a strategic factor in the offshore outsourcing 
decision. Knowledge is an intangible asset that is typically characterized as being less 
visible, more embedded, more tacit and less separable from the rest of the firm than 
tangible assets (Mudambi, Venzin 2010; Mudambi 2007, 2008). Mudambi and Venzin 
(2010: 1514) suggest that “an intangible asset controlled by the firm will be able to 
generate higher returns, ceteris paribus, than a competing firm that does not control 
the asset”.
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In the international business literature, the nature of knowledge is viewed as one of the 
major determinants of foreign entry decisions. Knowledge is an intangible asset that is 
tacit by nature. Therefore, when certain knowledge is necessary to undertake an activ-
ity abroad, it is more likely to be transferred within the firm than through the market 
because firms are more efficient vehicles for knowledge transfer (Kogut, Zander 1992; 
Hill et al. 1990). 
Recent theoretical literature suggests that the threat of imitation and the need to protect 
intellectual property rights are fundamental determinants of a firm’s decision to engage 
in either captive offshoring or offshore outsourcing (Fillat, García 2009; Chen et al. 
2008; Antràs, Helpman 2004; Quinn, Hilmer 1994). This is mainly because the use of 
captive offshoring makes companies less vulnerable to potential technology leakage. In 
this sense, captive offshoring is more likely than offshore outsourcing in knowledge-
intensive firms with a high risk of imitation (Antràs 2005). 
Some empirical evidence confirms these arguments. Fillat and García (2009) analyzed 
how companies organized their R&D abroad, i.e. the mode of offshoring that companies 
preferred when offshoring R&D activities. The results indicated that knowledge-inten-
sive firms tended to offshore through own affiliated subsidiaries (captive offshoring) 
rather than through offshore outsourcing because these firms were more vulnerable to 
technology leakage. Chen et al. (2008) analyzed how the nature of the assets affected 
the choice of organization mode (captive offshoring versus offshore outsourcing). The 
authors considered two types of assets (physical assets and knowledge assets), and 
investigated whether knowledge-intensive firms preferred one mode of offshoring to 
the other. Their results signaled that knowledge-intensive firms tended to use captive 
offshoring strategies. 
Essential activities often involve more knowledge-based activities, which are typically 
more tacit in nature. They are often characterized by complex and less standardized 
interfaces than other activities. Where ongoing exchanges of knowledge and quick de-
cisions are required, the efficiency of knowledge exchange and subsidiaries’ response 
times are likely to be shorter than when a third-party provider is involved – especially 
if those decisions trigger the renegotiation of the outsourcing contract. When interfaces 
are defined and standardized, it is much easier to write an outsourcing contract, set 
milestones and follow up on the contract; however the loosely defined interfaces often 
result in a rather vague outsourcing contract.
Some studies suggest that the decision to offshore advanced tasks is related to the firm’s 
knowledge and that a high share of knowledge employees in headquarters positively 
influences the offshoring of more advanced tasks (Ørberg, Pedersen 2010). According 
to hypotheses 1 and 2, non-core activities should be outsourced in the form of offshore 
outsourcing, while essential activities (more advanced activities) should be offshored in 
the form of captive offshoring. In this sense, if Ørberg and Pedersen’s (2010) arguments 
are true, knowledge-intensive firms will offshore more essential activities and they will 
do so through captive offshoring. Consequently, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H3: The likelihood that essential activities will be offshored using captive offshoring 
will be greater in highly knowledge-intensive firms.
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2. Data and methods
2.1. Research setting and data collection
This study’s population consists of manufacturing companies located in the EU-15 (Aus-
tria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom). The main source 
for population identification was the Amadeus database, which includes (financial) data 
on more than 10 million European companies from 34 countries. Two selection criteria 
were used to narrow the population: 1) companies that were “global ultimate owners” 
with subsidiaries abroad; and 2) companies with an “active” (or unknown) status. A total 
of 3,460 European companies fulfilled the criteria in the Amadeus database and all these 
companies were included in the initial data set. 
A survey of offshoring behavior was distributed by regular mail to these companies. 
The survey was translated into five languages (English, French, German, Italian and 
Spanish), so most companies had the opportunity to respond in their native language. 
The survey was designed and based on Dillman’s total design method (1978) in that 
Dillman’s recommendations of brevity, simplicity, accuracy and relevance were taken 
into account. Four stages of pre-testing, including evaluations by academic colleagues, 
were undertaken. The final questionnaire had 14 questions, which were derived from 
the literature and adapted to the specific context.
In July 2008, the questionnaires were distributed by regular mail to the head of the inter-
national department in each of the companies in the population. The envelope included 
a cover letter, the questionnaire itself (three pages) and a pre-paid return envelope. In 
the first round, 177 completed questionnaires were received, of which 21 had to be re-
moved from the sample for lack of data. A reminder was sent in December 2008, after 
which 107 usable questionnaires were received. In total, we obtained a usable sample of 
263 completed questionnaires, which represents a response rate of 7.6%. This is almost 
three points higher than the response rates in other studies based on postal surveys of 
global manufacturing companies (Yip, Dempster 2005). As shown in Table 1, the 263 
responses were divided among 15 different countries, providing a good representation 
of European manufacturing companies. 
Each firm was assigned a unique identification number. On the basis of this identifica-
tion number, we linked the survey data for each firm to general firm and accounting data 
in the Amadeus database. This combination of primary data (survey data) and secondary 
data (Amadeus database) lowers the potential for common-method bias.
The survey instrument was developed to map all of the offshoring and outsourcing ac-
tivities of the companies. As such, it covered all of the activities that were offshorable, 
regardless of whether they were essential activities or non-core activities. 
2.2. Measurement and validation of constructs
The dependent variable in the model – essential activity – indicates the strategic im-
portance of the activity offshored. It is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 
1 when the activity is “important or essential to the company’s competitive advantage” 
and the value of 0 when the activity is “of secondary importance to the competitive 
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advantage of the company”. In order to measure essential activity for five value chain 
activities (R&D and product design, production, purchasing and distribution, sales, and 
administration), we asked the companies about the importance of the offshored activities 
in relation to the company’s competitive advantage.
In total, 565 offshoring operations were carried out by the 263 companies. Of these, 
non-core activities had been offshored in 207 cases, while essential activities were off-
shored in 358 cases (see Table 2). Production and sales activities were offshored more 
often than other activities (123 and 172 cases, respectively). Notably, R&D and product 
design were also offshored to a significant degree (79 cases). 
The independent variables in the model are offshoring mode and the knowledge inten-
sity of the company. To measure offshoring mode, we asked about the mode used to 
offshore the activity. The offshoring mode for each of the five value chain activities 
was measured as a dichotomous variable that took the value of 1 in cases of “captive 
offshoring” (relocation of the activity to own subsidiary: fully owned subsidiaries) and 
the value of 0 when the company was “offshore outsourcing” activities (relocation of 
the activity to a third party or a non-equity joint venture). The knowledge intensity of 
the company was measured using the share of low-skilled employees as a percentage of 
Table 1. Distribution of responses received, by country of origin 
Origin country
Surveys sent Surveys received Response 
rate, %Number of surveys % Number of surveys %
Austria 50 1.45 8 3.04 16.00
Belgium 147 4.25 7 2.66 4.76
Denmark 133 3.84 13 4.94 9.77
France 219 6.33 16 6.08 7.31
Finland 91 2.63 4 1.52 4.40
Germany 488 14.10 50 19.01 10.25
Greece 175 5.06 11 4.18 6.29
Holland 125 3.61 6 2.28 4.80
Ireland 35 1.01 4 1.52 11.43
Italy 706 20.40 56 21.29 7.93
Luxemburg 4 0.12 0 0.00 0.00
Portugal 27 0.78 2 0.76 7.41
Spain 629 18.18 49 18.63 7.79
Sweden 202 5.84 17 6.46 8.42
United Kingdom 429 12.40 20 7.60 4.66
EU-15 3,460 100.0 263 100.0 7.6
Sources: AMADEUS data base (2007) and own data collection.
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the total number of employees. This proxy variable was measured by asking respondents 
about the percentage of low-skilled employees involved in the value-creating process 
and was included as a continuous variable. The variable was reverse coded (multiplied 
by –1), as companies with a high share of low-skilled employees are viewed as less 
knowledge intensive, while a small share of low-skilled employees indicates that the 
company is more knowledge intensive. Finally, in order to test hypothesis 3, an inter-
action variable was created as the product of the two variables essential activity and 
knowledge intensity.
In order to control for the level of internationalization and access to resources, we in-
cluded two control variables: company size (number of employees) and international 
experience (number of years of international operations). Relative profitability was in-
cluded, as the offshoring of an activity might be triggered by red figures and deficits 
that force a company to move fast (most likely by offshoring non-core activities), or 
by a surplus that allows the company to act more strategically and consider offshoring 
more essential activities. This item was measured on a five-point Likert scale. Along 
the same vein, we added control variables to reflect the characteristics of the activities 
and the interfaces among them. These took the form of dummy variables for each of 
the activities and enabled us to control for different propensities to offshore essential 
activities for the five value chain activities (Chandra, Shankar 2004). As production 
activity was used as the baseline (excluded from the model), the coefficient for the four 
other activities should be interpreted relative to production activity.
The fact that our approach is not trivial is illustrated in Table 3. As expected, the share 
of captive offshoring is larger when essential activities are offshored than when non-core 
activities are offshored (74.7% versus 63.5%), while the opposite is true for offshore 
outsourcing. However, the table also indicates that although this pattern is dominant, 
other interesting patterns also seem to be hidden in the data, including a generally high 
level of captive offshoring. One reason for this finding might be that the population 
only includes those companies that have subsidiaries abroad, so companies that only 
use offshore outsourcing and have no foreign subsidiaries are not included.
Table 2. Distribution of the dependent variable, by activity (number of offshoring projects)
Essential activity Non-core activity Total
N % N % N %
R&D and product design 46 58.23 33 41.77 79 100
Production 91 73.98 32 26.02 123 100
Purchasing and distribution 56 58.33 40 41.67 96 100
Sales activities** 125 72.67 47 27.33 172 100
Administrative activities*** 40 42.11 55 57.89 95 100
TOTAL 358 63.36 207 36.64 565 100
Notes: ** Sales activities include marketing, sales and after-sales activities; *** Administrative activi-
ties include human resource management, finance, IT and management activities.
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Finally, in line with other research (Ok 2011; CAPS, A. T. Kearney Inc. 2005; Ehie 
2001), we added the drivers or motivations associated with the use of offshoring strate-
gies. We have identified 12 offshoring drivers in the literature and for each offshoring 
decision the respondents were asked to indicate the importance of the 12 drivers on 
a five-point scale (where 1 indicated very low importance and 5 indicated very high 
importance). Based on the responses, we carried out a principal components analysis 
with the aim of identifying the underlying factors for the 12 drivers. The results indi-
cated that the 12 drivers could be grouped into four factors that explained 65.1% of 
the total variance (among the 12 drivers). As shown in Table 4, factor 1 captures cost 
drivers (denoted cost drivers), while factor 2 is confined to drivers related to strategic 
Table 3. Share of activity by offshoring mode
Table 4. Rotated component matrixa
Motives Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
1. Reduce labor costs 0.814 –0.229 –0.010 –0.035
2. Reduce other costs 0.722 0.250 –0.035 0.000
3. Change fixed costs into variable 0.693 –0.071 0.250 0.175
4. Forecast costs more accurately 0.609 0.268 0.209 0.223
5. Access to new markets –0.150 0.779 –0.304 0.085
6. Improve the product quality 0.051 0.670 0.318 0.053
7. Reduce the response time to changes 0.202 0.679 0.297 0.045
8. Access to high skill employees 0.061 0.350 0.709 –0.106
9. Access to non available technology –0.011 0.058 0.782 0.249
10. Focus on core competences 0.317 –0.054 0.666 0.220
11. Follow the competitors 0.067 0.030 0.209 0.874
12. Common practice in the industry 0.131 0.103 0.049 0.874
aSix iterations for convergence. 
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changes or process improvements (strategic drivers). The drivers associated with access 
to resources are more prevalent in factor 3 (resource drivers), while drivers focusing on 
competitors are found in factor 4 (imitation drivers). 
Four control variables – cost drivers, strategic drivers, resource drivers and imitation 
drivers – were created based on the factor loadings and factor scores for each company. 
The exact operationalization of all of the variables is described in Table 5.
Table 5. Exact operationalization of the included variables
Variables Definition
Dependent variable
Essential activity Dichotomous variable that takes the value of “1” when the activity 
relocated is important or essential to the company’s competitive 
advantage and “0” when the activity is complementary or of 
secondary importance.
Independent variables
Offshoring mode Dichotomous variable that takes the value of “1” when the 
company uses “captive offshoring” and “0” when the company 
uses “offshore outsourcing”.
Knowledge intensity Proxy: percentage of low-skilled employees multiplied by (–1).
Interaction effect The product of the two variables: offshoring mode and knowledge 
intensity.
Control variables
Company size Logarithm of the mean of the number of employees for the last 
five years available (2002–2006) for each company.
International experience Number of years the company has been active in the international 
market.
Activity Activity relocated abroad (dummy variable: R&D and product 
design, production, purchasing and distribution, sales activities  
and administrative activities).
Relative profitability Progress of the company in terms of business results compared 
with its competitors as being (1) much worse than my competitors 
to (5) much better.
Cost drivers Cost drivers for the use of offshoring strategies (factor loading).
Strategic drivers Drivers related to strategic changes or process improvements 
(factor loading).
Resource drivers Drivers associated with access to resources (factor loading).
Imitation drivers Drivers related to competitors (factor loading).
E. Linares-Navarro et al. Fine slicing of the value chain and offshoring of essential activities ...
125
3. Analysis and results 
In order to detect potential problems of multicollinearity among the independent vari-
ables in the model, we first examined the bivariate Pearson correlations among all of 
the variables included in the model. The correlation matrix presented in Table 6 shows 
that, in general, the correlations are rather low. In fact, the highest correlation among the 
independent variables is 0.343, which is found between company size and international 
experience. This is below the usual threshold of 0.5 for detecting potential problems of 
multicollinearity. In addition, we calculated the variance inflation factors (VIF) associ-
ated with each of the variables in the model shown in Table 7. The VIF values were 
all less than 1.2, which indicates that this data does not seem to suffer from multicol-
linearity problems. 
Table 6. Correlation matrix












0.189** 0.043 0.343** 1
5. Activity 0.166** 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
6. Relative 
profitability
0.120** 0.079** –0.008 0.075** 0.000 1
7. Cost drivers –0.123** –0.121** –0.094** 0.055* 0.000 –0.063** 1
8. Strategic 
drivers
0.124** –0.022 –0.028 –0.068** 0.000 0.023 0.000 1
9. Resource 
drivers
–0.160** 0.119** –0.024 0.005 0.000 –0.029 0.000 0.000 1
10. Imitation 
drivers
–0.060 0.005 –0.064** 0.018 0.000 –0.127** 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
Mean 1.70 –40.75 5.00 28.63 3.43 3.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
S.D. 0.46 31.03 1.53 23.72 1.40 0.87 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
VIF 1.189 1.081 1.209 1.193 1.051 1.063 1.055 1.061 1.060 1.037
Notes: * p < 0,05; ** p < 0,01.
As the dependent variable in our model (essential activity) is binary (with the values 
of 0 and 1), the hypotheses were tested using a binomial logit regression model. In a 
binomial logit model, the likelihood that a company will offshore an “essential activity” 
versus a “non-core activity” will be:
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where xi is a vector that contains the individual characteristics for the company i on the 
independent variables (x) and b is a vector of parameters. The results of logit regression 
are shown in Table 7.
Table 7. Logit regression models (standard errors in parenthesis)
Logit 1 Logit 2 Logit 3
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Logit 1 Logit 2 Logit 3
c2 38.05*** 50.61*** 57.97***
–2 log likelihood 704.3 691.8 684.4
Cox and Snell R2 0.065 0.086 0.098
 Nagelkerke R2 0.089 0.117 0.133
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test (c2) 4.186 5.695 1.647
Correct classification (%) 66.0 67.3 67.6
N 565 565 565
Notes: † ≤ 0.10; * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001.
In the first model (Logit 1), we only include the control variables, while we include 
the offshoring mode (captive or offshore outsourcing) and the knowledge intensity as 
independent variables in the Logit 2 model. The effect of the offshoring mode in the 
offshoring of essential activities is positive and significant. However, the main effect 
of knowledge intensity in the offshoring of essential activities is not significant. The 
substantial decrease of the –2 log likelihood value (12.5 for 2 degrees of freedom (d.f.) 
from Logit 1 to Logit 2 indicates that the Logit 2 model fits the data better than the 
model with only control variables (Logit 1).
In the third model, which is fully specified (Logit 3), we test all of our hypotheses. 
When moving from the Logit 2 model to the Logit 3 model, the – 2 log likelihood value 
(7.4 for 1 d.f.) decreases, indicating that the Logit 3 model offers a better fit with the 
data. In this model, we introduce the interaction effect between the offshoring mode and 
knowledge intensity. The offshoring mode is highly significant (p = 0.000) and positive, 
as hypothesized. This indicates that when activities close to core activities are offshored, 
captive offshoring is typically the mode of choice. As such, this result supports hypoth-
eses 1 and 2. The interaction term that is added in order to test hypothesis 3 is also 
positive and significant, which indicates that the relation between captive offshoring and 
the offshoring of essential activities is stronger in companies that are more knowledge 
intensive, as hypothesized. To facilitate the interpretation of the interaction effect, we 
used the procedure outlined by Aiken and West (1991) in that we plotted the high and 
low levels of each variable (one standard deviation above and below the mean). Figure 5 
depicts the interaction effect related to Hypothesis 3. 
The highest level of offshoring of essential activities is found in the case of captive 
offshoring by firms with high knowledge intensity. The plot reveals that the choice of 
offshoring mode (captive offshoring) has little impact on the offshoring of essential 
activities in firms with low knowledge intensity (a flat line with a slope close to zero), 
while captive offshoring substantially increases the level of offshoring of essential activ-
ities in firms with higher levels of knowledge intensity (the line with the steep increase).
End of Table 7
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Conclusions 
Recent decades have brought a dramatic increase in the amount of both captive offshor-
ing and offshore outsourcing. This wave of offshoring and relocating of value chain 
activities has been fueled by changes in the political and regulatory environments of 
host countries, which have eased considerably. Other contributing factors include more 
efficient, less expensive information and communication technologies, and new tech-
niques for organizing the value chain, such as fine slicing and standardization of inter-
faces among activities. In addition, the intensification of global competition implies that 
many companies cannot afford to put all of their eggs in one basket; in other words, they 
cannot assume that they can get access to the most advanced innovations, knowledge 
and talented people in a single location (the home country). Instead, companies are 
increasingly forced to create a global network that enables them to tap into knowledge 
in other parts of the world. This implies a need to offshore more knowledge-based 
activities. This global networking trend, in turn, makes supply chains longer and more 
fragmented (Christopher et al. 2011).
Interestingly, this wave of offshoring not only includes manufacturing, IT and more 
standardized activities, where offshoring is driven by cost savings and mainly involves 
low-skilled labor, but it also includes more advanced activities, like research, design, en-
gineering and product development, as highlighted in many studies (e.g. Lewin, Cuoto 
2006; Baden-Fuller et al. 2000). This study, which is based on 263 European companies, 
confirms that although more traditional activities capture the major part of offshoring, 
more advanced and knowledge-based activities also take a significant part. As our data 
show, R&D and product design activities represent approximately 15% of all offshor-
ing (79 out of 565 offshoring operations). It has been suggested in the literature that 
offshoring is shifting from the relocation of standardized activities to the offshoring 
of more advanced and knowledge-intensive processes, activities that require domain 
expertise, subject expertise and higher-end professional talent. This claim might go too 
far, as most offshoring is still driven by cost savings considerations, at least in part. 



























Low captive offshoring High captive offshoring
Low knowledge intensity
High knowledge intensity
E. Linares-Navarro et al. Fine slicing of the value chain and offshoring of essential activities ...
129
However, the offshoring of more advanced activities is certainly not insignificant. This 
raises a number of interesting research questions, particularly because the theoretical 
development in this area has been slow. 
The conventional theoretical wisdom, which is based on transaction cost theory and 
the resource based view, is that companies should keep their core activities close to 
headquarters. The main argument in this respect is that companies should do everything 
possible to protect their core activities. The offshoring or outsourcing of core activities 
might entail a risk that others could steal or imitate key knowledge, as it will be more 
difficult to control core activities that are offshored or outsourced.
The biggest challenge is to understand the extent to which the theoretical focus on the 
protection of core activities aligns itself with the empirical findings related to the ris-
ing trend of offshoring advanced activities that are close to the core. In this paper, we 
have argued that a finer-grained concept of core versus non-core activities is needed, 
a concept that is generally in line with the increased fine slicing of the value chain 
activities (Jabbour 2012). The classification of activities as either core or non-core may 
lead to serious oversimplifications of the complexity of the activities, as some activi-
ties obviously are closer to the core than others. As a first step in achieving this more 
fine-grained understanding, we propose that distinctions be made among three types 
of activities: 1) true core activities that are the really distinctive and crucial activities; 
2) essential activities that are complementary to core activities and highly important; 
and 3) non-core activities that are more peripheral but still relevant to the success of the 
company. In fact, essential activities are often originally viewed as core activities but 
are later separated out as companies upgrade and redefine their core activities. Typically, 
true core activities center around more architectural competences, while more opera-
tional activities are separated out (fine sliced). When the relevant interfaces between 
these and other activities are in place, such activities can be offshored or outsourced. 
We developed three hypotheses based on the ideas that essential activities can, in fact, 
be offshored to a company’s own subsidiary (captive offshoring), and that such off-
shoring will be even more pronounced among knowledge-intensive companies. The 
hypotheses were tested in a logit regression model using data on 565 cases of offshoring 
(spanning five different activities). The hypotheses were basically supported. In general, 
we view the results as confirmation that some activities closer to the core (essential ac-
tivities) can be offshored successfully using a captive mode. Although most companies 
prefer to be highly protective and keep their core activities close to the headquarters, we 
suggest that the results indicate that companies are increasingly being forced to open up 
to more knowledge-based offshoring in order to be able to source knowledge and talent 
in other parts of the world. 
This study shows that size and international experience are not determinants of the type 
of activity offshored. Any company, regardless of its size and international experience, 
can offshore essential and non-essential activities. However, the nature of the activity 
(R&D, production, purchasing, sales, or administration) seems to influence decisions 
on whether to offshore essential activities. Essential activities are more likely to be 
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offshored in production than in R&D, purchasing or administration. Finally, the results 
indicate that the decision to offshore essential activities is driven by strategic considera-
tions and not by such factors as cost, resource or imitation, and they show that essential 
activities are typically offshored using the captive mode, while offshore outsourcing is 
commonly used to offshore non-core activities. Moreover, the use of captive strategies 
to offshore essential activities is more pronounced in knowledge-intensive firms where 
the interfaces among the different activities are less standardized. 
Managerial relevance
These results offer managers and CEOs an integrative tool that may help ease decisions 
regarding offshoring modes (captive versus offshore outsourcing). Our analysis suggests 
that this important choice is typically based on the type of activities to be offshored. 
An analysis at the activity level has been frequently been advocated (Ørberg 2011; 
Contractor et al. 2010; Ørberg, Pedersen 2010; Buckley, Ghauri 2004), and this paper 
moves the level of analysis from the macro level to the micro level. As each generic 
activity in the value chain can be divided into sub-activities (see Fig. 2), the CEO’s role 
in identifying the parts of an activity that can be unbundled is important. Furthermore, 
CEOs must understand that the distinction between core and non-core activities is not 
dichotomous but continuous. In addition, they need to understand that this distinction 
is not static – it may change depending on the continuous identification and evaluation 
of activities carried out by the CEOs. Therefore, it is not static. 
The results of this study confirm what some authors have suggested: “The very nature of 
the activities or business functions and the strategic objective of the focal firm can influ-
ence the decision-making process of the managers at the disintegration stage” (Kedia, 
Mukherjee 2009:259). This paper can serve as a reference point for further analyses of 
the implementation of offshoring strategies in multinational enterprises. The importance 
of these strategies, especially in manufacturing companies, and the trends toward fine 
slicing the value chain and offshoring more advanced activities support our research. 
In conclusion, we stress that the study and analysis of the offshoring phenomenon re-
quire more attention from academics, companies and European institutions if we are to 
know more about the true reality associated with these strategies. As Kedia and Mukher-
jee suggest, “additional research should be conducted to clearly identify what activities 
of the firm can be unbundled and what activities should remain under the hierarchical 
control” (2009: 259). In this sense, this paper offers a number of results that can be 
useful for companies that are considering the implementation of offshoring strategies, 
and for companies that are considering a shift in their offshoring strategies.
Limitations and future research
This study presents some limitations that should be considered in future research. The 
first one is related to the sample. The sample used is covering the use of offshoring strat-
egies in European multinationals and it does only include information for companies 
that do conduct offshoring. It does not include information about the not-chosen alter-
natives; therefore it’s not possible to analyze one of the important decisions in the IB 
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literature – whether or not to offshore. These data only allows to analyze the important 
decisions on how to organize offshoring activities (captive or not), which is depending 
the strategic importance of the activities (essential or not).
This study is focused on the fine-slicing of the value chain, and makes a conceptual dis-
tinction between core, essential and non-core activities. However, the data only allows 
us to analyze the use of offshoring mode in essential and non-core activities, assuming 
that core activities are not susceptible to offshoring. Basically, we don’t have informa-
tion on core activities that allow us to analyze if companies use offshoring strategies for 
core activities. Future research should include these activities in order to offer a more 
complete model of offshoring decision. 
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